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THE INTENT DOCTRINE AND CERD:
How THE UNITED STATES FAILS TO MEET ITS
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE

By

AUDREY DANIEL 1

INTRODUCTION

Although the United States ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
(hereinafter "CERD" or "the Convention"), it does not further
its human rights objectives. Specifically it fails to address the Intent Doctrine, which requires that a plaintiff prove a perpetrator's intent to discriminate to win an equal protection claim. This
doctrine violates CERD's very definition of discrimination.
Utilizing a disparate impact standard of discrimination, CERD
offers broad protections against modern forms of discrimination
such as implicit bias and structural racism. The Intent Doctrine,
in comparison, is unequipped to combat these latent, yet incredibly pervasive types of racial discrimination. Because of this substantial disconnect between Supreme Court precedent and the
United Nations treaty, the United States is in violation of its
commitment to the Convention and to the ideals set forth
therein. While other party states maintain progressive standards
similar to those laid out by CERD, the United States refuses to
modify its laws to comply with the Convention. It continues to
implement a doctrine that is ill-equipped to remediate contem1 This article was written in conjunction with Equal Justice Society, an organization founded to overturn Washington v. Davis. Special thanks to my family, Damien Jovel, Sara Jackson, Brando Starkey, Fabian Renteria, Reggie
Shuford and Eva Paterson for their outstanding input and support.
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porary manifestations of race-based discrimination. This article
will explore how the Intent Doctrine violates the very fundamentals of CERD's human rights objectives, and provide suggestions for how civil and human rights advocates can leverage
CERD's language and international mandate to advance antidiscrimination law in the United States.
Central to this article is the distinction between an "intent"based standard and a disparate impact standard. With respect to
race-based discrimination claims, the United States' "Intent
Doctrine" requires that a plaintiff prove that the alleged discriminatory action was done with the specific intention to discriminate based on race. 2 This standard is almost impossible to
prove in contemporary race-discrimination claims. 3 Modern discrimination is less likely to be overt or based on explicit racial
4
animus, and is more often subtle, indirect or even unconscious.
The Intent doctrine is incapable of addressing this type of discrimination and has impeded the development of United States
discrimination jurisprudence since its inception. On the other
hand, the disparate impact analysis utilized in CERD focuses on
the effect of an alleged discriminatory act. This broader standard, (referred to herein as "disparate impact," "effects-based,"
and "indirect discrimination") refocuses the inquiry towards
whether an action actually resulted in discrimination, instead of
whether an actor intended to discriminate. Modern social science illustrates that most discrimination functions at a subconscious and structural level. This creates discriminatory effects
even absent any "intent" to discriminate. Consequently, an effects-based standard is better equipped than the Intent Doctrine
to address contemporary discrimination. The international community has embraced a disparate impact standard, in large part
to take an effective and proactive stance against racial discrimination. The United States, however, refuses to comply with its
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
See e.g., Mcleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
4 See infra Part II.B.
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obligation as a CERD party to declare a similarly firm stance.
Consequently, the United States fails to effectively address contemporary racial discrimination.
Part I of this article describes CERD in depth, concluding that
the United States' commitment to CERD was and remains
largely symbolic. With specific attention to the disparate impact
standard and how it operates, the article discusses the history
and structure of the Convention, as well as the limiting stipulations the United States attached at ratification. In Part II, the
article argues that the Intent Doctrine is not only inadequate to
remedy modern discrimination, but also violates the provisions
of CERD. It explores Washington v. Davis, the 1976 Supreme
Court case that established the Intent Doctrine precedent, and
discusses two types of modern discrimination-implicit bias and
structural racism-to demonstrate how the Intent Doctrine fails
to effectively address racial discrimination in the United States.
The article then focuses on the conflict between the intent and
disparate impact standards, discussing the interaction between
CERD's Enforcement Committee and the United States bodies
charged with effectuating the Convention. Part III highlights the
domestic discrimination standards of other CERD party states
with a focus on the United Kingdom, Canada and South Africa. 5
This section shows that other party states not only comply with
CERD's anti-discrimination obligations, but that they have explicitly rejected the Intent Doctrine in favor of broader, more
effective discrimination protections. Finally, Part IV discusses
actions that the legal community and the public can take to enforce CERD's disparate impact standard within the United
States. Specifically, it explores working towards either overturning Washington v. Davis, or calling for legislation to effectively
implement the provisions of CERD. Overall, this article will
These countries were chosen because they are all party states to CERD,
and have considered the intent requirement in their discrimination jurisprudence but rejected it for the more effective disparate impact standard of
CERD.
5
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demonstrate that through the Intent Doctrine, the United States
does not take its international obligations against racial discrimination seriously, as opposed to other party states that maintain
far more progressive and effective standards that do comply
with CERD.
PART I: CERD

The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination is one of the most celebrated
and embraced international human rights treaties. Originally
drafted in 1965, this treaty is described as "the most comprehensive and unambiguous codification in treaty form of the idea of
the equality of the races." 6 This section will discuss the history of
CERD, the structure of its language with special attention to its
standard for discrimination and its corresponding enforcement
mechanisms, and the outpouring of support for CERD from the
international community. It will then analyze the limitations set
forth by the United States upon ratification, concluding that
they are so broad that the United States' commitment to CERD
and its purpose was largely a symbolic gesture to the international community.
A.

History of CERD

In the winter of 1959 to 1960, a sudden surge of anti-Semitic
incidents worldwide created demand for an international convention aimed at eliminating discrimination. 7 In response, the
United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (hereinafter "the Sub-Commission") adopted a resolution declaring that such events
violated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and recomEgon Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 996, 1057 (1966).
6

7 NATAN

LERNER, THE

U.N.

CONVENTION

FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 1
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mending specific actions to combat these and similar occurrences.8 After the General Assembly approved the resolution, it
undertook to create an instrument by which signatory states
would be required to affirmatively impose measures to alleviate,
and eventually eliminate, discriminatory acts and practices
within the state. 9 The resolution, "Manifestation of Racial
Prejudice and National and Religious Intolerance," became the
precursor to CERD.1o
The General Assembly's Third Committee concluded that
two separate conventions would be prepared: one dealing with
the epidemic of religious intolerance and the other with racial
prejudice.11 Because various delegations asserted that issues of
race were more urgent than religious intolerance, the General
Assembly agreed to prioritize the instrument dealing with racial
discrimination. 12
In 1964, the Sub-Commission formulated the language of the
Convention, which "embodied the world community's declaration of an international standard against racial discrimination
and 'drew its primary impetus from the desire of the United Nations to put an immediate end to discrimination against black

8 Schwelb, supra note 6, at 997-98.
9 Id.
10 Michael

B. de Leeuw et al., The Current State of Residential Segregation
and Housing Discrimination: The United States' Obligations Under the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,

13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 337, 341 (2008).
11 Schwelb, supra note 6, at 999.
12 Id. The "decision to separate the problem of 'religious intolerance' from
that of 'racial discrimination' had been brought about by political undercurrents which had very little to do with the merits of the problem. The opposition to coverage of religious as well as racial discrimination had come from
some of the Arab delegations; it reflected the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, many delegations, particularly those from Eastern Europe, did not consider questions of religion to be as important and urgent as questions of
race." Id.
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and other nonwhite persons."' 13 Reflecting the urgency to create a convention prohibiting racial discrimination, the General
Assembly quickly and unanimously adopted CERD on December 21, 1965.14 The final version was later depicted as "the international community's only tool for combating racial
discrimination which is at one and the same time universal in
reach, comprehensive in scope, legally binding in character, and
equipped with built-in measures of implementation."15 As a
mechanism to promote international human rights, the United
Nations created CERD to promote and enforce broad racial discrimination protections within each signatory state.
Once the language of CERD was finalized, it gained instant
support. Upon opening for signature in March of 1966, there
were already twenty-two signatories by the end of June 1966.16
By signing the Convention, signatory states indicated their intention to take steps towards ratification. Signatory states are
prohibited from acting in any way that would defeat CERD's
purpose.17 Today, out of the 192 United Nation Member States,
173 are parties to the Convention. i , Each party state has ratified
the Convention, consenting to be bound by its terms.' 9 In addition, there are currently five states that have signed but not yet
ratified CERD.20 CERD receives broad support for its human
Leeuw, supra note 10, at 342, (quoting Theodor Meron, The Meaning and
Reach of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination,79 AM. J. INT'L L. 283, 284 (1985)).
13

14

Id.

15 Meron, supra note 13, at 283.
16 Schwelb, supra note 6, at 997.
17 Glossary, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/pagel-en.xml
(Last visited
Aug. 1, 2010).
18 United Nations Member States, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/en/members/
index.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). Status: InternationalConvention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang-en (last visited Aug. 1, 2010).
19 Glossary, supra note 17.
20

Status, supra note 18.
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rights objectives, as evidenced by the fact that the vast majority
of the United Nations Member States have become parties and
undertaken to implement its anti-discrimination provisions.
B. Structure of CERD
The Convention is composed of a Preamble and twenty-five
articles. The Preamble sets out the international concerns and
ideals that led to its formation. 21 Articles 1 through 7 define racial discrimination and affirmatively impose an obligation on
states to take steps towards the elimination of all forms of such
discrimination within their jurisdiction. 22 Next, Articles 8
through 16 establish a reporting and monitoring scheme designed to ensure states' compliance with CERD.23 Lastly, Articles 17 through 25 govern the manner by which CERD is
ratified, entered into force, and amended. 24 The main focus of
inquiry here will be Article 1, specifically CERD's definition of
"racial discrimination." In addition, CERD's established enforcement mechanisms will be explored and analyzed with respect to the United States' compliance.
i.

"Racial Discrimination" Defined

The very first sentence of Article 1 of CERD defines "racial
discrimination" as,
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, ecoInternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
21

22

23
24

Id. at art. 1-7.
Id. at art. 8-16.
Id. at art. 17-25.

Volume
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nomic, social, cultural or any other field of public
life .25

Especially relevant in this definition for purposes of this article
is the explicit inclusion of a disparate impact standard, signified
by the phrase "or effect." 26 This standard focuses not on the discriminatory motives of a state actor, but rather on the discriminatory effects of a law or policy without regard to the purposes
behind it. In other words, if a state maintains a law or policy that
was enacted for an entirely non-discriminatory purpose, it still
may be in violation of CERD if it creates a racially disparate
impact.
Article l's drafting history demonstrates that the inclusion of
an effects-based standard was intentional and generally unopposed. 27 In the initial drafting phase, three versions of Article 1
28
were submitted to and considered by the Sub-Commission.
Only one definition explicitly specified that discriminatory effects would also constitute violations of the Convention; the
other two were silent on the issue. 29 These latter two definitions
could very well have been construed to include such an analysis,
as they substituted the language "purpose or effect" with the
more ambiguous "based on." 30 A working group produced a

version that included the discriminatory impact standard. It was
almost identical to the definition eventually adopted by
CERD.31 The proposed text made its way through the SubCommission, the Commission and the Third Committee before

28

Id. at art. 1 (emphasis added).
Id.
Lerner, supra note 7, at 25-6.
Id. at 25.

29

Id. at 26.

30

Id. at 25-6. "The text proposed by Mr. Abram included in the term 'racial

25
26
27

discrimination' any 'distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of

race, colour or ethnic origin, and in the case of States composed of different
nationalities or persons of different national origin, discrimination based on
such differences.' The text proposed by Mr. Calvocoressi added to the words,
'distinction', 'exclusion' or 'preference' the word 'limitation.' Id.
31

Id. at 26.
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finally receiving unanimous approval. 32 During that process,
''purpose or effect" remained unchanged while other aspects of
the definition were debated. 33 The intent of the drafters is made
clear by the explicit inclusion of an effects-based inquiry in the
language, and strengthened by the lack of debate on the issue.
Thus, from its inception, CERD was broadly designed to protect
against racially discriminatory acts and impacts.
After defining racial discrimination, CERD discusses the obligations imposed upon states with regard to that definition.3 4 Not
only do states have a fundamental obligation to refrain from
supporting or participating in acts of discrimination, they also
have affirmative duties to "take effective measures to review
governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind
or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of cre35
ating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists."
States must also "prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances,
36
racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization."
In this manner, CERD requires the party states to take measures to review its policies in light of the disparate impact definition, as well as affirmatively take steps to eradicate racial
discrimination within the state. 37
ii.

Enforcement Mechanisms

In addition to laying out anti-discrimination obligations that
party states must strive to achieve, the Convention establishes
Id. at 25-7.
Id. at 25-8. For instance, a highly contested element of the definition was
the inclusion of protections based on national origin. Members pointed out
that different translations of national origin signified citizenship while many
did not, so this was clarified in the text. See CERD, supra note 21, at art. 1.
32

33

34
35
36

CERD, supra note 21, at art. 2.
Id.
Id.

Id. See also, Id. at art. 5. (listing specific rights that should be guaranteed
to all without distinction).
37
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four enforcement mechanisms designed to ensure that signatory
states comply with these obligations. First, Article 8 creates a
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter "the Committee"), made up of human rights experts who
are tasked with monitoring CERD's implementation.38 The
Committee ensures compliance through mandatory reporting
procedures, and provides states with feedback on how to further
CERD's goals. 39 Also, Articles 11 through 13 establish a dispute-resolution mechanism, in cases where one party feels that
another party is not in compliance with CERD's obligations.40
In addition, Article 14 allows parties to recognize the competence of the Committee to hear complaints from individuals or
groups within the jurisdiction. 41 Finally, Article 22 permits parties to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice to hear disputes between parties over the interpretation
or application of CERD.42 The main procedures utilized in practice to implement CERD's obligations are the reporting procedures outlined in Article 8, discussed in detail below, and the
individual complaint mechanism of Article 14. 43 While signing
and ratifying the Convention implies a commitment to fulfilling
its obligations, many states decline from enforcement through
failing to recognize the competence of the Committee to hear
complaints, and instead submitting only to the mandatory reId. at art. 8.
Id.
Id. at art. 11-13.
Id. at art. 14.
42 Id. at art. 22.
43 See Cindy Galway Buys, Application of The InternationalConvention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination(Georgia v. Russian
Federation), 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 294 (2009) (discussing the first ever decision
in which the International Court of Justice interpreted and applied CERD in
2008); Human Rights Bodies - Complaints Procedures, OFFICE OF THE
38
39
40
41

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,

http://www2.

ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2010)
(describing various inter-state complaint procedures, including that established by Articles 11-13 of CERD, and noting that none of those described
have ever been used).
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porting procedures. Those states that do allow for strong enforcement of CERD are reinforcing their commitment to its
goals within their jurisdictions and, in doing so, are promoting
human rights and anti-discrimination ideals more broadly. Much
to its detriment, the United States has resisted recognizing or
implementing many of CERD's established enforcement
mechanisms.
C.

United States' Reservations, Declarations
and Understandings

In signing and ratifying CERD, the United States attached
numerous stipulations and declarations to limit the ability to
bring discrimination claims based on the anti-discrimination
standards set forth in CERD. This section will discuss each in
turn. Collectively, these restrictions lead the enforcement mechanisms set forth in CERD to have little to no effect in the
United States, and its non-self-executing status disallows enforcing it as domestic law. 44 Thus, should a United States policy violate CERD, there are few, if any, avenues for remediation due
to the extensive U.S restrictions.
In 1966, President Johnson signed CERD, but the official ratification process did not begin until 1978. 45 At that point, President Carter submitted CERD to the Senate for review, and
included a list of reservations, understandings, and declarations
to accompany it.46 Even then, the limitations proposed would
serve to undermine CERD because they essentially exempted
the United States from any requirement that did not already
The interstate complaint procedures outlined in Articles 11-13 have never
been utilized, and thus will not be discussed in detail here. See Complaints
Procedures, supra note 43.
45 Arlene S. Kanter, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilitiesand Its Implications for the Rights of Elderly People Under
InternationalLaw, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 527, 569 (2009).
46 Id.
44
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conform to United States law. 47 The Senate did not ratify
CERD, and it was not again proposed until the Clinton Administration. 48 Finally, in 1994, President Clinton presented CERD
to the Senate, along with limitations similar to President
Carter's, and it was ratified. 49 The political atmosphere in both
the Carter and Clinton administrations was such that both Presidents assured the Senate that ratifying any human rights treaty
would not have a restrictive effect on domestic laws. 50 Thus, the
limitations set forth in CERD ensured that there could be no
effective enforcement of its provisions. It took almost three decades for the United States to ratify one of the leading human
rights treaties. The United States did so only by including broad
limitations that essentially exempt it from requirements of any
proactive efforts to eliminate racial discrimination. The United
States ensured that its citizens do not have an avenue to challenge discrimination, or inadequate standards such as the Intent
Doctrine, through the application of international human rights
law.
i.

Non-Self-Execution

A key declaration accompanying CERD's ratification and
limiting its impact from the outset was "[t]hat the provisions of
Id. (citing Terry D. Johnson, Unbridled Discretion and Color Consciousness: Violating InternationalHuman Rights in the United States CriminalJus47

tice System, 56
48 Id.

RUTGERs

L.

REV.

231, 244 (2003)).

Id.
David Sloss, The Domestication of InternationalHuman Rights: Non-SelfExecuting Declarationsand Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129,
174-5 (1999)("[W]hen President Carter did finally advocate U.S. adherence
to several major human rights treaties, he felt that it was a political necessity
to assure the Senate that the treaty power would not be used to change domestic law. No subsequent administration has challenged the inherited political wisdom that such an assurance is the price that must be paid to obtain
Senate consent to ratification of human rights treaties." (citation omitted)).
49

50
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the Convention are not self-executing." 51 This limitation means
that unless the United States creates implementing legislation,
the provisions of the Convention do not allow for a private right
of action in domestic courts. 52 Because Congress has not created
any implementing legislation, no individual or organization may
bring a claim in a domestic court to enforce the provisions of
CERD. 53 Despite Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, which
states that treaties are the supreme law of the land, by ratifying
CERD as non-self-executing the Senate stripped it of any domestic legal effect. 54 In essence, the United States may effectively opt out of CERD entirely55
During the CERD ratification process at the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, a number of human rights organizations
56
spoke out against ratifying a non-self executing Convention.
Many found that this declaration essentially nullified CERD's
purpose as applied to the United States, that it undermined Article VI of the United States Constitution, and that it sent a message that the United States is not committed to CERD's
objectives. 57 First, the NAACP urged the Senate not to include
the declaration, stating, "[T]his device if accepted will deny
large sections of the American people 'the protection of internaU.S., CERD, Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, BAYEFSKY.COM, http://www.bayefsky.conlhtml/usa t2-cerd.php (last visited Nov. 1,
51

2010).
52 Robin H. Gise, Rethinking McCleskey v. Kemp: How U.S. Ratification of
the InternationalConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Provides a Remedy for Claims of Racial Disparity in Death Penalty Cases, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2270, 2298 (1999).
53 See Johnson v. Quander, 370 F.Supp.2d 79, 101 (D. DC 2005) (discussing
other Courts' findings that CERD is not self executing).
54 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
55 Nkechi Taifa, Codification or Castration?:The Applicability of the International Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discriminationto the U.S.
CriminalJustice System, 40 How. L.J. 641, 655 (1997).
56 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination:Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Rel., 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994).
57

See Id.
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tional human rights law as a supplement and backstop to constitutional protections."58 Similarly, Amnesty International USA
compared the declaration to a shield preventing United States
citizens from fully enjoying those rights guaranteed in the international human rights treaty. 59 It also stated that non-self-execution is unnecessary if United States law is in fact consistent with
CERD, and that it gives the impression that the United States is
unwilling to give its citizens all available avenues to challenge
discrimination in domestic courts. 60 In opposition to non-self execution, the ACLU argued that the Convention's protections
should be immediately enforceable in United States courts in
order to not undermine Article VI of the U.S. Constitution. 61
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights agreed that "it
would undermine one of the principal reasons why the Constitution made treaties the law of the land ...Incorporation of this
declaration will unnecessarily delay U.S. compliance with some
provisions and set up unnecessary political obstacles to U.S.
'
compliance generally. "62
The International Human Rights Group pointed out that the
United States generally urges the enforceability of international
human rights standards in domestic courts in order to strengthen
democracy, and yet, this declaration suggests that the United
States is "afraid to practice what it preaches." 63 Similarly, The
World Federalist Association opposed the declaration, arguing
that the United States should take a lead in emphasizing rule of
law as a means of peaceful dispute resolution.64 Finally, the MiId. at 51 (statement of Wade Henderson, Director, Washington Bureau of
the NAACP).
59 Id. at 65 (statement of the ACLU).
60 Id. (statement of the ACLU).
61 Id. at 62 (statement of the ACLU).
62 Id. at 69, 72 (letter to Senator Pell from Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights).
63 Id. at 52 (statement of William T. Lake, partner, Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering).
64 Id. at 80 (statement of William L. Robinson, Dean, District of Columbia
School of Law).
58
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nority Rights Group stated, "[t]he effect would be to dilute the
force of the Convention as ratified by the Senate and to call into
question, on an international level, the commitment of the
United States to the elimination of racial discrimination within
its own borders." 65 Despite the urging of these and other human
rights groups, the Senate included this declaration so that the
provisions of CERD are not enforceable in United States
courts. Consequently, claims of racially disparate impact that do
not meet the high-level Intent Doctrine standard, unless other
specific statutes apply, will not be heard in the courts of the
66
United States.
ii.

Individual Complaint Mechanism

Another broad limitation set out in the United States' ratification was the refusal to recognize the competence of the Committee to receive and consider individual or organization
complaints. The victims' complaints assert CERD violations by
the United States. 67 Thus, an individual or organization in the
United States is not only precluded from bringing a CERD
claim within the U.S. court system, but is also prevented from
bringing that claim to the Committee. While recognizing the
Committee is voluntary, committing entirely to the Convention,
including all of its enforcement procedures, manifests a state's
willingness to fully address any violation. The Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights declared
that "[t]he ability of individuals to complain about the violation
of their rights in an international arena brings real meaning to
Id. at 76 (statement of the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights and
the Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights).
66 Certain statutes provide for a disparate impact standard and therefore
claims based on these statutes would be heard in domestic courts. However,
these claims must fall within certain areas of the law such as voting rights,
leaving other types of racial discrimination to satisfy the requirements of the
Intent Doctrine.
67 Status, supra note 18 (listing those nations that recognize the Committee's
competence, which does not include the United States).
65
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the rights contained in the human rights treaties." 68 Fifty-three
states are fully dedicated to addressing any internal violations of
CERD by recognizing the competence of the Committee to hear
complaints.69 The United States, however, has declined to recognize its competence. Thus the Committee cannot hear claims
from individuals or organizations in the United States alleging a
disparate impact, or any other, violation of CERD.70
iii.

Competence of the International Court of Justice

Another limiting effect of the United States' CERD ratification is its failure to consent to the International Court of Justice's jurisdiction. Consenting to the court's jurisdiction is
necessary in order to be party to any claim arising before the
International Court of Justice under CERD. 71 Article 22 allows
for disputes between state parties to be heard by the International Court of Justice if they are not resolved by negotiation or
by the Committee. 72 Thus, while states may bring claims against
the United States to the Committee, a practice which has never
been used, it can only be finally resolved by the International
Court of Justice should the United States consent. 73 In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, the Legal Advisor of
the U.S. Department of State explained that this reservation was
necessary to protect the United States from claims brought for
frivolous or political reasons.7 4 The Minority Rights Group addressed that concern in the Hearing record, asserting:
Threats or fear of frivolous complaints should not
subvert the United States' greater interests in sup69

Complaints Procedures, supra note 43.
Id.

70

Id.

68

U.S. Reservations, supra note 51.
CERD, supra note 21, at art. 22.
73 See U.S. Reservations, supra note 51.
74 Hearing,supra note 56, at 13 (statement of Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State).
71

72
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porting and encouraging international human
rights standards and enforcement mechanisms.
A reservation to Article 22 will raise international
concern regarding the United States' commitment
to the Race Convention, suggesting to parties already having ratified the Convention that the
United States will not take its obligation to enforce the Convention's provisions seriously. In
making a reservation to Article 22, the U.S. puts
itself in the company of states such as Libya, Syria,
Cuba, and China, who also have reservations to
Article 22 currently in force. Support has been
shown both at home and abroad for international
75
dispute resolution through the ICJ.
Similar to the arguments against ratifying the Convention as
non-self-executing, organizations voiced that this reservation
would undermine the commitment to eliminating racial discrimination. It sends the message to the international community that
the United States does not consider this a serious obligation.
However, these arguments have not deterred the United States
from insisting on its limitations. The result is that while the
United States considers itself at the forefront of progressive civil
rights policy, there are very few avenues for victims to enforce
CERD's anti-discrimination obligations against the United
States.
iv.

Symbolic Nature of Unites States' Ratification

Through its broad limitations of the established enforcement
procedures, the United States has made clear that discrimination claims, as defined by CERD, will not be enforced within its
borders. The Senate ratified on the condition that no U.S. law
would be amended based on the Convention. The U.S. definition of discrimination demonstrates how the United States con75

Id. at 75 (statement of Minority Rights Group).
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tinually violates the Convention.76 Thus, these restrictive
provisions were put into place so that no individual, group or
state could compel the United States to comply with CERD. 77
After waiting almost 30 years to ratify the Convention, combined with the lack of commitment to its enforcement and goals,
reveals to the international community and to its own inhabitants that the United States' commitment to CERD was largely
a symbolic gesture.
By ratifying CERD, the United States did not intend to
amend any of its policies to conform to CERD's obligations.
Through its limiting reservations, declarations and understandings, it ensured that no domestic policy would be scrutinized by
the international community, nor enforced through domestic
courts. While Article 2 of the Convention requires that each
state party proactively takes steps to combat racial discrimination within its jurisdiction, the United States has refused to address a basic difference in the very definitions of racial
discrimination. 7 8 The enforcement mechanisms, the reporting
procedures, the competence of the Committee to hear individual and organization's complaints, the interstate complaint process, and the International Court of Justice demonstrate that
there is little possibility that the United States will address the
troublesome Intent Doctrine.
The United States even prohibits its own citizens from bringing complaints to the Committee. The international community
will not hear or know of legitimate CERD claims from individuals within the United States. 79 While the interstate complaint
process is permitted, in which one state may allege a CERD violation taking place within another state, it has never been utilized.80 If a dispute were not resolved through that process it

78

Sloss, supra note 50, at 174.
Id.
CERD, supra note 21, at art. 22. See infra Part II.C.

79

See supra Part II.B.ii.

80

See Complaints Procedures,supra note 43.

76
77
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81
would be brought before the International Court of Justice.
Given its unwillingness to submit to other enforcement procedures, and its allegation that claims against the United States
would be brought for frivolous or political reasons, it is assumed
that the United States would rarely, if ever, consent to the International Court's jurisdiction. 82 Thus, the United States has ensured that the international community will not hear claims
from within the United States, nor from other states. To further
reduce the binding effect of CERD provisions, the U.S. domes83
tic courts also lack jurisdiction to hear CERD-based claims.
Thus, not only is pressure from the international community to
amend the restrictive Intent Doctrine ineffective, but CERD
also has no legal effect within U.S. courts to address this discrep-

ancy. The United States has unmistakably ratified CERD with

no intention of honoring its obligations or goals and this is especially true with respect to the Intent Doctrine.
The United States ratification of CERD is a symbolic gesture.
The evidence for this is based on the Senate's conditional ratification of the CERD that ratification would in no way affect domestic policy, and the Senate's use of limiting language to blunt
available recourses for violations. The United States did not intend to actually comply with CERD's obligations and only ratified the Convention as a hollow attempt to assert its human
rights commitment. The United States' dedication to CERD's
central purpose is lacking, as the Intent Doctrine continues to
limit the United States' ability to address racial discrimination
claims in accordance with the basic objectives of CERD.
PART

11: THE

INTENT DOCTRINE

The United States maintains a basic understanding of the nature of racial discrimination that is anachronistic and far nar81

82
83

See Id.
See supra Part II.B.iii.
See supra Part II.B.i.
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rower than CERD's definition. As discussed above, the
definition of racial discrimination adopted by the Convention allows for a broad, effects-based disparate impact inquiry as a basis to assert a claim. In order to succeed in a constitutional claim
of racial discrimination the United States requires that a party
prove either that a law or policy was enacted with the intent to
discriminate, or that an individual's action was motivated by explicit racial animus. 84 This latter method, established pursuant to
the Intent Doctrine, not only closes the courthouse doors to numerous claims of racial discrimination, but also disregards the
character of modern discrimination. The following section will
discuss the history of the Intent Doctrine, exploring reasons and
examples of why it is incapable of addressing modern discrimination in the United States. It will then address the CERD
Committee's alarming reaction to the Intent Doctrine, as well as
the United States' refusal to recognize its inadequacies in addressing racial discrimination.
A.

Washington v. Davis

The Supreme Court of the United States created and applied
the Intent Doctrine in 1976, in the landmark case Washington v.
Davis.85 There, a group of black applicants aspiring to become
Washington D.C. police officers alleged that certain recruitment
procedures were racially discriminatory.86 The applicants alleged
that these procedures violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 87 Specifically, the applicants offered evidence that a
written personnel test designed to measure verbal skills dispro84

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).

85
86

See Id.
Id. at 232.

Id. at 233 (because the action took place in Washington D.C., the respondents sued based on a Fifth Amendment claim and not the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, which applied only to the states.
However, this did not change the equal protection analysis as applied to the
Fifth Amendment and the ruling applies to Fourteenth Amendment claims).
87
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portionately excluded black applicants, and that it bore no relationship to job performance. 88 Thus, the issue before the Court
was whether the racially disproportionate effect of the test, without regard to the police department's intent, constituted a violation of equal protection. 89
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the test. 90 The
personnel test at issue evaluated whether an applicant to the police force had acquired a specified level of verbal skills.91 The
evidence showed that 57% of black applicants to the police
force failed the test, barring them from the force, whereas only
13% of white applicants failed. 92 Challenging the rationale behind the test, which resulted in whites passing at four times the
rate of blacks, the court explained that "absent evidence revealing some other reason for the lopsided failure rates appearing here, it is difficult to imagine how disproportionate effect
could ever be better demonstrated." 93 The appellate court also
noted that the disproportionate impact of generalized intelligence tests is "the result of the long history of educational deprivation, primarily due to segregated schools, for blacks."94 After
a finding of disparate impact, the burden shifted, requiring the
police department to show that the test bore a demonstrable relationship to successful performance in the department. 95 The
court deemed any effort of the department to recruit black officers irrelevant as an explanation for the lopsided figures, and
thus held that the benevolent intent of the department was an
insufficient response to the discriminatory effects of the test. 96
Because the police department could not adequately prove the
88

Id.

89

Id. at 229.

Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
91 Id. at 958.
90
92

Id. at 958-59.

Id. at 960.
Id. at 961.
95 Id. (basing the burden-shifting analysis on the "Griggs Standard" annunciated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
96 Id. at 960.
93
94
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test's job-relatedness, the Court of Appeals invalidated the test
based on its clear discriminatory impact. 97
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court refocused the
analysis from the test's job-relatedness to the intent of the department with respect to the creation and administration of the
test. 98 The Court of Appeals borrowed the effects-based standard from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court argued that the standard does not extend to the
Constitution. 99 Despite the fact that the Court had previously
established a disparate impact standard to assess Title VII
claims of employment discrimination, it now refused to extend
those standards to equal protection claims identical in nature.1 00
Rather, the Court created a new framework for evaluating constitutional claims of racial discrimination: the Intent Doctrine.
The Court of Appeals noted that this case perfectly exemplified a policy yielding racially disproportionate effects in violation of the Constitution.l0 However, the Supreme Court added
a requirement that is virtually impossible to prove and resulted
in a loss for the black applicants. The Supreme Court did not
focus on the fact that the result of administering this test was
that more white applicants were hired to the police force than
black applicants.102 If the effects-based inquiry were employed,
the Court argued, it could invalidate an entire range of statutes
that are burdensome to black people and not to whites. 10 3 Instead, the Court shifted its analysis to the state actor's subjective
frame of mind, imposing the additional requirement that the test
be administered with the purpose of discriminatingagainst black
applicants. 0 4 Because the black applicants could not prove that
Id. at 965.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
99 Id. at 239.
100 See Id.; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
101 Davis, 512 F.2d at 960.
102 Washington, 426 U.S. at 245.
103 Id. at 248.
104 Id. at 238.
97

98
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the test was designed and administered with the specific intent
to discriminate against them based on their race, the Court
found in favor of the police department.1l s This became the first
application of the Intent Doctrine that barred a claim of discrimination that would have otherwise been held valid under a
discriminatory impact framework. It also marked the beginning
of a new era: the regression of anti-discrimination law in the
United States.
B.

Perils of the Intent Doctrine

Thus far, this article has examined both the disparate impact
standard utilized by the international community in CERD, and
the Intent Doctrine employed by the United States, as established in Washington v. Davis. The former, effects-based inquiry
is better suited to remedy the types of present-day discrimination prevalent in the United States. Specifically, the Intent Doctrine is unequipped to combat either implicit bias or structural
racism, both of which social scientists have found contribute to
vast disparities based on race. These latent forms of discrimination are deeply rooted in the United States' long history of racebased discrimination. The element of intent is absent from the
operation of both implicit bias and structural racism. Thus, despite their pervasiveness, neither form of modern discrimination
is subject to claims of unconstitutional racism in the United
States.
i. Implicit Bias
Implicit bias exists in nearly every aspect of society and yet is
largely unintentional. Social science research shows that people
categorize others based on certain biases and stereotypes.10 6
Id. at 250.
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 337 (1987).
105
106
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This mental process is a means to efficiently interpret ones' surroundings without having to take the time to deliberate. 0 7 Thus,
people are completely unaware that this "categorization" pro10 8
cess is even taking place.
In a social context, social scientists refer to the process of an
individual learning to categorize others based on embedded so'
cietal opinions as "assimilation."109
Children at a very early age
perceive the dominant cultural attitudes towards specific races
but are too young to separate their own beliefs from those of the
people around them. 10 Children not only pick up on attitudes
that may be implicit and manifested only through subtle action,
but are also too young to disconnect these feelings from facts.IH
Thus, the child inherits strong attitudes and beliefs about racial
categories without the conscious participation of the child or anyone else. Throughout life, every experience that supports these
learned, implicit beliefs will only serve to strengthen them. At
the same time, a person's unconscious will resist interpreting situations that challenge their ingrained categories unless forced to
do so. 112 Thus, in order to interpret their surroundings, people
generally make quick judgments by categorizing people based
on race, attaching everything they have learned about that specific race, while remaining largely unaware that this cognitive
process is taking place.
The study of implicit bias has gained prominence as the
United States has moved towards rejecting explicit manifestations of racism, despite continuing to be plagued with its effects.
While many allege that the United States is now "post-racial,"
clear racial distinctions persist in almost every measure of social
welfare, including education, housing, employment, criminal jus107

Id.

108

Id. at 339.

Id. at 337.
110 Id. at 338.
M1 Id.
112 Id.
109

Volume

-,

Number

z

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol4/iss2/3

Spring 2011
24

Daniel: The Intent Doctrine and CERD: How the United States Fails to Meet

TH-E INTENT DOCTRINE AND CRD

287

tice, health care, and transportation." 3 In order to understand
how and whether our subconscious beliefs and behaviors could
perpetuate such discrepancies, social scientists have developed
numerous tests to measure the extent and nature of implicit
bias. The Implicit Association Test (hereinafter "IAT"), hosted
by Project Implicit at Harvard University, measures positive and
negative associations with specific races based on response
time.11 4 For instance, the subject will be asked to connect certain
positive notions, such as laughter or peace, with white people,
and negative concepts, such as evil or agony, with black people. 115 While most respond quickly to this relatively simple task,
response time is almost always increased when the subject is
asked to then connect the positive concepts with black people
and the negative ones with white people." 6 This slower response
time reflects people's unconscious reluctance to challenge implicit biases about race.117 Available online since 1998, the IAT
has compiled extensive data about racial preferences, all indicating that implicit bias is very much prevalent in today's society.',,

In fact, more than two-thirds of test takers register bias towards
stigmatized groups. 119 Of whites and Asians who take the test,
75-80% demonstrate an implicit preference for whites over
blacks. 120

113 See Reginald Shuford, Why Affirmative Action Remains Essential in the
Age of Obama, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 503 (2009); Eva Paterson, Kimberly
Thomas-Rapp, & Sara Jackson, Id, the Ego and Equal Protection in the 21st
Century: Building Upon Charles Lawrence's Vision to Mount a Contemporary
Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175 (2008).
https://implicit.harvard.edu/
114 Project Implicit, IMPLICIT.HARVARD.EDU,
implicit (last visited August 16, 2010).
115 General Information, PROJECT IMPLICIT.NET, http://www.projectimplicit.
net/generalinfo.php (last visited August 16, 2010).
116 Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundation, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 952-53 (2006).
117 Id.

118 General Information, supra note 115.

119 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 116, at 957-58.
120 General Information, supra note 115.
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A 2004 study regarding implicit bias in hiring processes illustrates the practical effects of these findings.121 In this study, fictitious resumes were sent in response to help-wanted ads in
Boston and Chicago, and each was randomly assigned a stereotypical white or black name. 122 Across industry, occupation and
employer size, the white-sounding names received 50% more
callbacks despite otherwise identical resumes. 123 It is fair to assume that most, if not all, of those employers did not consciously
make the decision to respond to white applicants and not black
applicants. 124 Rather, their implicit negative biases towards the
black applicants guided their actions.
It is clear from the IAT that implicit bias is powerful, widespread, guides people's actions, and perpetuates the racial disparities present in the United States today. In fact, the IAT
demonstrates that implicit bias measures are significantly better
at predicting people's actual behavior than explicit bias measures (i.e., whether or not someone considers themselves to be
prejudiced towards particular groups).25 However, because
people are not making intentional decisions based on explicit
racial animus, but rather based on learned, unconscious stereotypes, the Intent Doctrine is powerless to combat implicit bias.
ii.

Structural Racism

Structural racism is yet another framework for understanding
modern racism and examining how racism is woven into the
very fabric of our society. Studies on structural racism examine
how entire systems can function to discriminate through institutionalized practices and procedures, often built in over generaSee Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination,94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004).
122 Id. at 991.
123 Id. at 992.
124 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 116, at 966.
125 Id.
121
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tions.126 Here, a discriminatory effect is not traced back to a
single, specific action but rather is understood to result from the
cumulative impact of interactions within a discriminatory system
or set of systems. 127 For instance, housing discrimination, itself a
product of deeply embedded structural racism, is not an isolated
phenomenon of residential segregation, but is also connected to
discrimination in other systems, such as education and criminal
justice.12 8 A child who is geographically isolated from a decent
school system may not only receive a sub par education, but is
also more likely to get arrested and become part of the criminal
justice system. 129 These interactions between systems perpetuate
a vicious cycle of discrimination, though they do not depend on
a single, intentional act to initiate the injustice.130 Because this
type of embedded racism does not focus on direct causation, but
rather results from circumstances that cumulatively cause racial
131
disparities, the remedy cannot rely on a finding of fault.
A systems approach changes the focus from assigning culpability to solving a problem and redressing a harm. Parties may be called upon to
address harms they may not have directly caused
or intended to cause. In many cases, these harms
were predictable or foreseeable, even if they were
unforeseen in fact. 132
Addressing the causes and effects of racial disparities is a
preferable approach to the Intent Doctrine, as discrimination results in an appreciable harm whether intended or not. The D.C.
Court of Appeals in Washington v. Davis alluded to this concept
when it discussed how the history of educational segregation
John A. Powell, Structural Racism: Building Upon the Insights of John
Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 796 (2008).
126
127

128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 796.
Id. at 796-97.

Id.
Id. at 797.
Id. at 798.
Id.
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was affecting the test scores, and in turn affecting employment. 133 While invalidating the written personnel test alone
would not have alleviated the entrenched cycle of racial disparity, ruling that the disparate impacts of the test constituted discrimination could have impeded the cycle and contributed to an
overall less racially imbalanced system. The police department
would have been tasked with creating a fairer test, which would
ultimately have contributed to a more diverse system of employment opportunity. In turn, this outcome would hinder a cycle of
structural exclusion by resulting in greater opportunity for members of historically marginalized groups. Thus, utilizing an effects-based inquiry would enable the courts to address systemic
racial disparities closer to their root, whereas focusing on the
intent of the actor leaves the discriminatory system fully intact.
iii.

McCleskey v. Kemp

Perhaps most illustrative of the devastating effects of the In13 4
tent Doctrine is the Supreme Court case McCleskey v. Kemp.
In this case, the Court held that despite clear evidence of racial
disparities in capital sentencing, suggesting both implicit bias
and structural racism, a death row inmate must demonstrate
that his or her sentence was issued with the intent to discriminate based on race. 135
Warren McCleskey, a black, death row inmate, alleged that
1 36
his Equal Protection rights were violated during sentencing.
In support of his claim, McCleskey presented a study on the link
between race and capital sentencing, which incorporated two
statistical inquiries based on over 2,000 murder cases in Georgia
134

Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
See Mcleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).

135

Id. at 297.

133

Id. at 286. McCleskey had been found guilty of two counts of armed robbery and one count of murder of a white police officer in 1978. He was then
sentenced to death based on the murder charge. In addition to his 14th
Amendment claim, he also brought an 8th Amendment claim. Id. at 283-86.
136
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during the 1970s.137 Among other findings, the study demonstrated that the death penalty was assessed in 22% of cases involving black defendants and white victims, and just 1% of those
involving black defendants and black victims.138 It also found
that defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times
more likely to receive the death penalty than those charged with
killing black victims. 139 The Court, however, stated that in order
to prevail on his Equal Protection claim, McCleskey must prove
that during his own sentencing, the decision-makers intended to
discriminate against him based on his race. 140 Also, in response
to McCleskey's claim that the state violated the Equal Protection Clause by enacting and implementing this capital punishment scheme, the Court declared that "[f]or this claim to
prevail, McCleskey would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because
of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect."' 14 Requiring
McCleskey to prove that those involved in the legislative process sentenced him to death because of his race effectively created an insurmountable barrier to his claim. Furthermore, the
court defended its ruling by arguing that McCleskey's claim to
proceed would open a floodgate of Equal Protection claims
based on discriminatory impact in the criminal justice system. 142
Ultimately, McCleskey was not able to prove that the state created or implemented its death penalty statute with the purpose
of racially discriminating against him, and his claim was
1
denied. 43

137 Id. at 286-87. The Baldus study, named after Professor David Baldus,
took into account 230 nonracial variables that could otherwise explain the
disparities. The Court accepted the validity of the study. Id.
138

Id. at 286.

139

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

140
141
142
143

287.

292.
298.
315-16.
320.
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McCleskey demonstrates the disconnect between the United
States' approach to evaluating discrimination and the manner by
which discrimination actually operates. The study relied upon in
McCleskey was a disturbing evaluation of the death penalty in
1970s Georgia. The study relied on disparate impact evidence to
demonstrate the clear existence of implicit bias and structural
racism within Georgia's criminal justice system. The stark disparities in the capital system reflected the implicit biases of the
juries, prosecutors, lawmakers, and the ingrained institutional
racism in 1970s Georgia. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, dissented:
[I]t would be unrealistic to ignore the influence of
history in assessing the plausible implications of
McCleskey's evidence. '[A]mericans share a historical experience that has resulted in individuals
within the culture ubiquitously attaching a significance to race that is irrational and often outside
their awareness.'. . . The Georgia sentencing system... provides considerable opportunity for ra-

cial considerations, however subtle and
unconscious, to influence charging and sentencing
decisions. History and its continuing legacy thus
buttress the probative force of McCleskey's statistics. Formal dual criminal laws may no longer be in
effect, and intentional discrimination may no
longer be prominent. Nonetheless, as we acknowledged in Turner, "subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes" continue to be of concern, and the
Georgia system gives such attitudes considerable
room to operate. The conclusions drawn from McCleskey's statistical evidence are therefore consistent with the lessons of social experience.1 44

Id. at 332-34 (citing Lawrence III, supra note 106 and Turner v. Murray,
46 U.S. 28, 35 (1986)).
144
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Despite the repercussions of Georgia's historical discrimination, the Court challenged McCleskey to find some type of
"smoking gun" evidence demonstrating the state's intent to discriminate against him. In all likelihood, this evidence never
existed.
Through McCleskey, the Supreme Court reinforced the Intent
Doctrine. The Supreme Court did not allow for broad constitutional discrimination protections and denied McCleskey's claim,
effectively denying any similar claim regarding the discriminatory implementation of criminal justice. 145 The consensus of the
international community is that evidence of disparate impact,
such as in McCleskey, should trigger a violation of equal protection. The Intent Doctrine alone does not offer broad enough
protections against more subtle, yet incredibly pervasive forms
of contemporary racial discrimination. 146
C.

The Conflict Between CERD and the Intent Doctrine

As discussed previously, the international community has embraced a broad, effects-based standard for evaluating discrimination claims, while the United States continues to implement a
narrower, intent-focused standard. Despite being a party state
to CERD, the United States does not recognize this conflict.147
Nor has it fulfilled its obligation to address this discrepancy,
even after the Committee recommended that it do so. 148 Instead,
the United States claims that the Intent Doctrine is virtually the
same as the disparate impact standard used in CERD, essen149
tially refusing to respond to the Committee's concern.
145 Gise, supra note 52, at 2287 (referring to Davis v. Greer, 13 F.3d 1134
(7th Cir.) and Fuller v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 851 F.2d
1307 (11th Cir. 1988), both of which relied on McCleskey).
146 See infra Part II.B.
147 See infra Part I.C.
148 See infra Part I.C.
149 See infra Part I.C.
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The United States first acknowledged the potential conflict
between CERD's disparate impact standard and the Intent Doctrine upon ratification.150 On May 11, 1994, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing to discuss the potential
ratification of CERD.151 There, the Acting Secretary of the Department of State inserted into the record an official analysis of
CERD in support of ratification, much of which was later
adopted in reporting to the CERD Committee.15 2 In this lengthy
memorandum, the Secretary recognized the obligation in Article 2 that requires state parties to "amend, rescind or nullify any
laws and regulations" that have the effect of "creating or perpetuating racial discrimination."' 15 3 In response, he discussed certain
federal civil rights statutes that have broader protections than
those offered by the Intent Doctrine.154 However, the statutes
mentioned only deal with discrimination in specific situations,
such as voting. Thus, the statutes do not offer the broad disparate impact protections in all instance of discrimination as laid
out in CERD. He then discussed the Intent Doctrine, citing
Washington v. Davis and noted that only intentional discrimination is prohibited under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
as well as 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1982.155 In order to reconcile
CERD's obligations with the United States' existing discrimination standards, the Secretary simply stated that disparate impact
is taken into consideration when evaluating intent. 56 However,
150
151

See Hearing, supra note 56.
Id.

152 Id. at 22-35 (statement of Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary, Department
of State).
153 Id. at 33 (referring to CERD, supra note 21, art. 2).
154 Id. (mentioning, specifically, the disparate impact standard in the Voting

Rights Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Federal Regulations
Implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Fair Housing
Act).
155

Id.

156

Id.

"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose exists de-

mands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). Disparate impact may provide
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he conceded that in most cases adverse effect is not determinative, but rather the court will consider statistical disparities
along with other evidence that may collectively demonstrate intent.1 5 7 He proceeded to essentially equate the Intent Doctrine
with CERD's effects-based standard.15s In short, he reasoned
that the U.S. was actually in compliance with CERD based on
the interpretation that actions having an "unjustifiable disparate
impact" included unnecessary actions that caused significant statistical disparities. 59 The Secretary concluded that the Intent
Doctrine encompassed all of those types of actions, implying
that they were necessarily intentional.16 ° In making this determination, the Secretary cited to an excerpt from the Committee's
General Recommendations, saying "[i]n seeking to determine
whether an action has an effect contrary to the Convention, it
will look to see whether that action has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent,
or ethnic origin."161 The Secretary interpreted this to mean that
prohibited discrimination, as applied to race-neutral practices, is
that which creates statistically significant racial disparities and is
also unnecessary. 162 He then concluded that given such an explaan important starting point for that inquiry. Id. Indeed, where racial disparities arising out of a seemingly race-neutral practice are especially stark, and
there is no credible justification for the imbalance, discriminatory intent may
be inferred. See Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). In most cases,
however, adverse effect alone is not determinative, and courts will analyze
statistical disparities in conjunction with other evidence that may be probative of discriminatory intent. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-67. If the
totality of the evidence suggests that discriminatory intent underpins the
race-neutral practice, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify that practice. Id. at 271 n.21 (citing Mt. Healthy City School Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle. 429
U.S. 274 (1977)).
157 Hearing, supra note 56, at 33 (statement of Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary, Department of State).
158
159
160
161
162

Id.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 33.
Id.
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nation for CERD's definition of discrimination, CERD does not
impose any obligations on the United States that are contrary to
existing law.16a Essentially, this leap of logic alleges that showings of disparate impact are only unjustifiable if they are intentional. While not entirely sound, the United States later used
this same reasoning in response to the Committee's recommendations to eliminate the Intent Doctrine.
According to protocol, each state party must submit regular
reports to the Committee regarding its compliance. The Committee then issues observations based on these reports. In its initial report submitted in 2000, the United States discussed the
history of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, focusing on the
Equal Protection Clause. 164 In over a page, the report discussed
the Equal Protection Clause from its inception through present
day, cited a total of twelve decisive cases but failed to mention
Washington v. Davis or the Intent Doctrine.165 The majority of
the cited cases demonstrate strong protections against racial discrimination, and yet one of the most damaging rulings to those
protections is noticeably absent. 166 Later in the report, however,
the Intent Doctrine is addressed, and the United States offered
almost an identical response to the Secretary's reasoning discussed above. 167 Similar to the Secretary's analysis, this initial
report concluded that the Intent Doctrine is consistent with the
obligations imposed by CERD.168
Despite these assurances made by the United States, in the
Committee's response to the initial report it declared its concern
with the Intent Doctrine:
Id. at 33-34.
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention:
United States of America, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/351/Add.1, at 23-4 (Sep. 21, 2000), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100294.pdf.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 58.
168 Id.
163

164
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The Committee draws the attention of the State
party to its obligations under the Convention and,
in particular, to article 1, paragraph 1, and general
recommendation XIV, to undertake to prohibit
and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its
forms, including practices and legislation that may
not be discriminatory in purpose, but in effect.
The Committee recommends that the State party
take all appropriate measures to review existing
legislation and federal, State and local policies to
ensure effective protection against any form of racial discrimination and any unjustifiably disparate
impact. 169
Here, the Committee is essentially rejecting the United
States' argument that it is in compliance with the obligations relating to CERD's definition of racial discrimination. The Committee explicitly recommends that the United States take action
towards prohibiting and eliminating not only intentional racial
discrimination, but also discrimination based on an unjustifiably
disparate impact.170 In order to do so, the Committee recommends that the United States eliminate the requirement of
showing intent to prove discrimination under the Equal Protec171
tion Clause so that disparate impact claims may be addressed.
Thus, to be in compliance with the obligations imposed by
CERD, the Intent Doctrine must be overruled.
In its next report in 2007, the United States again argued that
based on the "unjustifiable disparate impact" language of General Recommendation 14, the Intent Doctrine is in compliance
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: United States of America, U.N. Doc A/56/18, 376 (Aug. 14,
2001), available at http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/international/shosh
one/documents/36CERDConcObs.pdf. This document also alludes to the existence of implicit bias and structural racism as residual effects of United
States' history. See Id. at 374.
169

170

Id. at 376.

171

Id.
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with the obligations imposed by CERD's definition of racial discrimination.172 This report stated that the United States would
address the Committee's concerns about the initial report, yet it
essentially presented, verbatim, the same reasoning as the initial
report. 173 This report also noted that General Recommendation
14, elaborating on CERD's definition of discrimination, is
merely recommendatory in nature. 174 While this may be true,
Recommendation 14 does not relieve the obligations imposed
on the United States as a party state to the Convention. The
General Recommendations are a guide to specific aspects of
CERD's language and implementation, and the fact that they
are not mandatory in nature is inconsequential to the obligations set forth in the language of CERD itself. Thus, the 2007
report in no way furthers the argument that the Intent Doctrine
is consistent with the obligations set forth in CERD.
Not surprisingly, the Committee's response, the most recent
to date, emphasized the very same concern over the Intent Doctrine. However, this time the Committee was even more explicit
than before and listed intent as its first concern:
The Committee reiterates the concern expressed
in paragraph 393 of its previous concluding observations of 2001 that the definition of racial discrimination used in the federal and state
legislation and in court practice is not always in
line with that contained in article 1, paragraph 1,
of the Convention, which requires States parties to
prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination in all
its forms, including practices and legislation that
may not be discriminatory in purpose, but in efPeriodic Report of the United States of America to the U.N. Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concerning the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N.
Doc CERD/C/USA/6, 106 (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/docu
ments/organization/83517.pdf.
173 Id. at 121.
174 Id. at 106.
172
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fect. In this regard, the Committee notes that indirect - or de facto- discrimination occurs where an
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice
would put persons of a particular racial, ethnic or
national origin at a disadvantage compared with
other persons, unless that provision, criterion or
practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim
and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary (art.1 (1)).
The Committee recommends that the State party
review the definition of racial discrimination used
in the federal and state legislation and in court
practice, so as to ensure - in light of the definition
of racial discrimination provided for in article 1,
paragraph 1, of the Convention - that it prohibits
racial discrimination in all its forms, including
practices and legislation that may not be discriminatory in purpose, but in effect. 175
Here, it is clear that the Committee again rejected the United
States' argument that it is in compliance with CERD. Not only
did the Committee reiterate its concern regarding the Intent
Doctrine, but it also went into even greater detail explaining
specifically how CERD's definitions of discrimination differ
from those applied by U.S. courts. By characterizing de facto
discrimination specifically, the Committee emphasizes that the
United States is failing to meet its obligation to prohibit such
discrimination. Again, the Committee is explicitly calling attention to the insufficiencies of the Intent Doctrine, both as it applies to the United States' party state obligations, and to its
protections against discrimination, generally.
This reporting process demonstrates not only that the international human rights community has grave concerns over the
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: United States of America, U.N. Doc CERD/C/USA/CO/6, 2
(2008).
175
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United States' implementation of the Intent Doctrine, but also
that the United States does not take those concerns seriously.
The fact that the Committee raised this issue multiple times
shows that the Intent Doctrine poses a severe threat to the implementation of CERD in the United States. However, the
United States repeatedly offered the same erroneous argument
that the Intent Doctrine complies with CERD, as opposed to
taking steps to actually be in compliance. This demonstrates a
conscious unwillingness on the part of the United States to meet
its treaty obligations. In order to reconcile this conflict, the
United States must recognize that the Intent Doctrine can not
and does not comply with the internationally accepted definition
of racial discrimination set forth in CERD.
PART III: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

At this point, this article has discussed how the United States
has not taken its obligations as a party state to CERD seriously,
specifically with respect to the Intent Doctrine. While other
party states are by no means free from racial discrimination,
their broad discrimination standards resemble the disparate impact standard espoused by CERD and therefore provide
broader protections against discrimination. In contrast, the Intent Doctrine not only fails to live up to the international CERD
standard, but also fails to provide the broad discrimination protections that other states grant through their own domestic
laws. 176 This section will explore the disparate impact standards
of the United Kingdom, Canada, and South Africa, focusing
particularly on how they relate to and offer broader protections
than the United State's Intent Doctrine.

176

See infra Part III.A-C.
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A.

The United Kingdom

As a member of the European Union, the United Kingdom is
required to comply with its Racial Equality Directive, which applies a disparate impact standard broadly to the areas of employment, education, social protection including social security
and healthcare, and access to the supply of goods and services,
including housing. 177 The language in this directive reads:

For the purposes of this Directive, the principle of
equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no
direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or
ethnic origin. . .indirect discrimination shall be
taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a
racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage
compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by
a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that
178
aim are appropriate and necessary.
The Directive mandates that each European Union member, including the United Kingdom, implement a discrimination standard that explicitly includes indirect discrimination. 179 The
United Kingdom has complied with this obligation through its
Race Relations Act. 180
The United Kingdom's Race Relations Act sets out a broad
disparate impact standard, pursuant to the European Unions
Racial Equality Directive. 181 Enacted in the same year that the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis, the Act protects from indirect discrimination in areas such as employment,
177

See Council Directive 2000/43/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22 (EC).

178

Id.

179 Maxine Sleeper, Anti-discriminationLaws in Eastern Europe: Toward Effective Implementation, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 177, 186 (2001).
180 See Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74 (U.K.).
181 Id.
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the provision of goods and services, education and public functions. 18 2 These areas are interpreted broadly, so that the
CERD's mandate of implementing a uniform disparate impact
standard is met. 183 Regarding the relative competance of these
standards, one scholar argues, "Britain has developed a new approach that incorporates theories of unconscious and institutional discrimination. American policymakers should recognize
the wisdom of the British example and authorize courts to adjudicate claims of discrimination employing the insights provided
18 4
by these theories."
Thus, the United Kingdom has met the requirements of both
CERD and the Racial Equality Directive with respect to its disparate impact standard. The United Kingdom is therefore better
equipped than the United States to combat contemporary forms
of racial discrimination.
The Race Relations Act also applies a model of anti-subordination aimed at eliminating racial discrimination in general, as
opposed to the United States' anti-discrimination model that
seeks to only remedy specific instances of discrimination. 185 This
progressive shift is evidenced by the Act's mandate that certain
public bodies monitor their own discriminatory impact even
before any claim has been brought. 18 6 Public bodies are required
to regularly self-evaluate their racial impacts, and if statistically
Id.
See Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.N. Doc. CERD/A/58/18 (2003). The Committee's most recent Concluding Observations did not make any mention that it was dissatisfied with
the disparate impact standard as it is applied there. Thus, it can be inferred
that the broad application of the standard is in compliance with the obligations of CERD.
184 Leland Ware, A Comparative Analysis of Unconscious and Institutional
Discriminationin the United States and Britain, 36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
89, 156 (2007).
185 Id. at 150.
186 Id.
182
183
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significant imbalances are found, they must be addressed. 18 7 This
self-evaluation was put into place to ensure that latent discrimination, such as implicit bias and structural racism, does not continue simply because a victim has failed to file suit. 188 This
approach, aimed at preventing discrimination within the system,
is far better equipped to impede and eventually eliminate racism
than is the Intent Doctrine.
Given the United Kingdom's disparate impact standard, combined with the self-evaluation requirement, the United Kingdom is far more dedicated to CERD's goal of eliminating racism
than the United States. In the United Kingdom, public bodies
monitor themselves to ensure there is no racially disparate impact of their actions, and address them if they exist. In the
United States, however, a victim must not only allege discrimination, but also must meet a far higher burden that does not
account for implicit or structural forms of bias and discrimination. This creates difficulty because many victims of discrimination do not have the means to bring suit, but in most cases even
if they did the standard bars them from an adequate remedy.
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has exceeded its European and international obligations by instituting this self-evaluation in furtherance of its anti-subordination goals. Thus, the
United States should take guidance from these broad discrimination protections offered by the United Kingdom.
B.

Canada

Canada has also passed a number of anti-discrimination measures, including section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, the section of the Constitution dealing with
equality rights in the application and operation of federal law. 8 9
187

Id.

Id.
189 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982, ch. 11, s. 15(1) (UK).
188
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To protect against private discrimination, Canada also passed a
Human Rights Act that applies to all federally regulated industries, such as airlines and banks.1 90 Also, each province has
passed its own legislation to protect against discrimination in order to supplement the federal acts that cover only the federal
government and federally regulated industries.191 The Supreme
Court of Canada has imposed a broad, disparate impact standard for all discrimination jurisprudence, thus applying the effects-based standard to both private and governmental
discrimination.192

The Canadian Constitution guarantees equality rights in the
application or operation of the law, and was interpreted by the
Supreme Court of Canada to evaluate discrimination using a
disparate impact standard.193 Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' that deals with equality rights,
states: "Every individual is equal before and under the law and
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age
94
or mental or physical disability."'
Tasked with interpreting how discrimination under this provision of the Canadian Constitution should be defined, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly rejected the Intent Doctrine
standard for the more inclusive effects-based standard.195

190 See Canadian Human Rights Act, c. 33, s. 1 (1976).
191 CATERINA VENTURA, FROM OUTLAWING DISCRIMINATION TO PROMOT-

ING EQUALITY: CANADA'S EXPERIENCE WITH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGIS-

4 (1995), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/
migrant/download/imp/imp06.pdf.
192 See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.R. 143
LATION

(Can.).
193 See Id.
194
195

Canadian Charter, supra note 179, at Sec. 15.
See Andrews, [19893 S.C.R. 143 (Can.).
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The Supreme Court of Canada contemplated the definition of
196
discrimination in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.
Andrews, a British citizen, permanently residing in Canada with
a law degree from Oxford, was prohibited from practicing law
because he was not a Canadian citizen.197 The issue before the
Court was whether this restriction violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 198 The Court looked to its own interpretation of the federal and provincial human rights acts and
explained that intent is not required because anti-discrimination
jurisprudence should focus on providing relief for victims, and
not on punishing the discriminator. 1 99 The Court explained that
intent is not required because anti-discrimination jurisprudence
should focus on providing relief for victims, and not on punishing the discriminator.200 Further justifying the use of the effectsbased standard, the Court went on to discuss the need to remedy systemic discrimination. 20 1 Therefore, the inquiry focused on
the effects of the law prohibiting non-citizens from practicing
law.2 0 2 The Court found that despite the lack of evidence that
this restriction was imposed intentionally to discriminate, the effect alone violated the equality rights of Andrews under the Canadian Constitution.203 Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada
applied a disparate impact analysis to the governmental discrimination section of its Constitution. The Court borrowed from its
analysis of the federal and provincial human rights acts. 20 4 The
disparate impact analysis is well-established law as evidenced by
196

197

See Id.
Id. at para. 2.

198 Id.

199 Id. at para. 19.
(citing Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985]
200 Id.

S.C.R. 536, 551).
201

See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.R. 143

(Can.).
202 See Id.
203 See Id.
204 See Id.
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its widespread application to both the Constitution and the
human rights acts.
Through the disparate impact standard imposed on its various
governing bodies, Canada has substantial protections that comply with its CERD anti-discrimination obligations. 20 5 Likewise,
in its analysis of an ideal definition of discrimination, Canada
explicitly discusses the shortfalls of the Intent Doctrine, arguing
that it is inappropriately aimed at punishing the discriminator
20 6
instead of making the discriminated victim whole again.
Drawing on the more progressive aims of addressing structural
racism and remedying victims, Canada's discrimination definition is better equipped than the U.S. Intent Doctrine to further
the goals of CERD.
C.

South Africa

Following its oppressive apartheid era, South Africa adopted
a new Constitution in 1996.207 The Bill of Rights of this new
Constitution reads:
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds,
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief,
culture, language and birth.. .No person may un-

See Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination: Canada, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (2007). The
Committee's most recent Concluding Observations did not make any mention that it was dissatisfied with the disparate impact standard as it is applied
there. Thus, it can be inferred that the broad application of the standard is in
compliance with the obligations of CERD.
206 See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.R. 143
(Can.).
207 S. AFR. CONST. 1996.
205
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fairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds [above].208
This broad equality standard includes language prohibiting indirect discrimination. Indirect discrimination is demonstrated
through disparate impact evidence and does not require evidence of intent. 20 9 As it transitioned from a system of legally
enforced racial exclusion to a constitutional democracy with an
express equal protection mandate, South Africa sought to take
every precaution against racial discrimination and thus included
the effects-based standard to ensure that all discrimination
would be addressed.210 This broader standard not only provides
far more protection from discrimination than does the Intent
Doctrine, but is also in compliance with the definition of discrimination set out by CERD.211
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Africa has
discussed the deliberate use of this more protective standard,
and why it is better equipped to combat discrimination than is
the Intent Doctrine.212 He stated that similar to the enactment
of 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as a response to
slavery, the equality provision, quoted in part above, was enacted as a response to apartheid.213 However, unlike the drafters
of the 14th Amendment, the South African Constitutional Court
had the benefit of evaluating international law as well as other
nations' domestic laws when drafting this provision. 214 The lanId. at ch. 2, art. IX, § 3, 4.
See Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, Brown v. Board of Education: Fifty
Years Later, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 503, 510-11 (2004).
210 See Id. at 509.
211 See Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination: South Africa, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/ZAF/CO/3 (2006).
The Committee's most recent Concluding Observations did not make any
mention that it was dissatisfied with the disparate impact standard as it is
applied there. Thus, it can be inferred that the broad application of the standard is in compliance with the obligations of CERD.
212 See Chaskalson, supra note 209, at 511.
213 Id. at 508.
214 Id. at 509-10.
208
209
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guage of the 14th Amendment does not indicate whether it requires proof of intent for a claim of discrimination.215 The South
African Constitutional Court explicitly made indirect discrimination a violation.216 In drafting this provision, the Constitutional Court specifically considered the Intent Doctrine,
compared it to other standards, and decided to model their Constitution after other countries' examples. 217 In making this decision, the Chief Justice stated: "It did so because it regarded the
purpose of the prohibition against indirect discrimination to be
the protection of vulnerable groups and not the punishment of
2
those responsible for the discrimination." 18
The Chief Justice discussed the failures of the United States in
the half century following the decision in Brown v. Board of
Ed., saying that "[d]espite the decision in Brown, neither the
legislature nor the courts have provided effective responses to
issues of race-based poverty and the segregation and discrimination associated with it, which remain part of life in the U.S."219
Further expanding on such failures, the Chief Justice explained
how unintentional, structural racism persists in the United
States as a result of past discrimination, because it does not take
the remedial approach that other nations take.220 The Constitu-

tional Court decided to follow that remedial approach to addressing discrimination, which it found necessary because
"[a]bsent a positive commitment progressively to eradicate socially constructed barriers to equality and to root out systematic
or institutionalised under-privilege, the constitutional promise
of equality before the law, and its equal protection and benefit

217

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Chaskalson, supra note 209. at 510-11.
Id. at 511.

218

Id.

219

Id. at 505 (referring to Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483

215
216

(1954)).
220 Id. at 507.
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must, in the context of our country, ring hollow." 221 So, after
considering numerous versions of discrimination standards, including the Intent Doctrine, South Africa enacted a progressive
disparate impact standard in order to fully address the lasting
effects of discrimination. This explicit inclusion of indirect discrimination into the South African Constitution not only furthers the purposes of CERD, but is also a direct response to the
failures of the Intent Doctrine.
PART IV: PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

In order to advance the human rights ideals of CERD, advocates in the United States should take action promoting a disparate impact standard for racial discrimination claims. While the
U.S. ratification of CERD was designed to limit its impact on
domestic policy, there are a variety of ways that it can be utilized to advocate for eliminating this anachronistic and ineffective policy. This section will briefly explore methods of using the
United States' commitment to CERD, however symbolic, to advocate for the elimination of the Intent Doctrine.
First, attorneys could refer to CERD's disparate impact standard in their pleadings, urging that it be implemented. While the
precedent of the Intent Doctrine must be followed, citing the
international example would contribute to the movement to
overturn Washington v. Davis through the education of the legal
community. This persuasive authority would call attention to the
United States' deficiencies in discrimination law, so that the legal community is fully educated on this issue. Once attorneys,
judges, and the legal community as a whole thoroughly grasp
that United States discrimination law is not only ineffective, but
also that it does not live up to our international obligations, it
will be far more open to overruling Washington v. Davis.
Minister of Fin. v. Van Heerden, 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC), at 141 para. 31 (S.
Afr.).
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The United States Supreme Court Justices have relied on international law as persuasive authority, demonstrating that citing CERD in pleadings could contribute to the elimination of
the Intent Doctrine.222 In discussing the impact of international
law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Justice Ginsburg noted:
Comparative analysis emphatically is relevant to
the task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights. We are the losers if we neglect
what others can tell us about endeavors to eradicate bias against women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups. For irrational prejudice and
223
rank discrimination are infectious in our world.
If enough of the legal community is invigorated by the idea
that we should honor our international human rights obligations, the Intent Doctrine could reach the Supreme Court and
be overturned.
Legislators could also pursue action to implement a disparate
impact standard in place of the Intent Doctrine. If the U.S. Congress were pressured to keep pace with the international community on this issue, it could effectively overrule the precedent
through legislative means. This could be accomplished simply by
passing legislation setting the constitutional discrimination standard as disparate impact, or indirectly through legislation that
implements CERD. The latter option, as described above,
would mean that the provisions of CERD would be enforceable
as domestic law, and thus individuals would be able to bring
claims of CERD violations based on its disparate impact stanSee, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (citing throughout to
international law and foreign sources to explain why the imposition of the
death penalty on juveniles was unconstitutional under the 8th Amendment's
evolving standards of decency).
223 Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States,
Remarks at The American Society of International Law 97th Annual Meeting: The Supreme Court and the New International Law (2003) quoting,
available at http://www.aclu.org/hrc/JudgesPlenary.pdf.
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dard. President Clinton declared through an Executive Order
that:
It shall be the policy and practice of the Government of the United States, being committed to the
protection and promotion of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, fully to respect and implement its obligations under the international
human rights treaties to which it is a party, includ224
ing ...CERD.
The public should enforce this "policy and practice" by urging
for legislation that enforces CERD. Through legislative means,
Congress should establish a cause of action for racial discrimination that can be proved through evidence of racially disparate
statistics. In order to achieve this goal, the legal community, and
the public as a whole, must pressure representatives to make
this a priority. 225 This would require a major public education
effort, so that the people of the United States understand the
dire need to address the Intent Doctrine. Should this become a
grave enough concern for its constituents, the issue will become
one that Congress will feel compelled to address. Creating such
legislation is a viable alternative to overturning Washington v.
Davis through the judiciary, but requires the public to urge Congress to address the deficiencies of the Intent Doctrine, and to
act to redress them.
Although CERD's ratification was designed to limit its implementation in the United States, there are still methods to compel CERD's disparate impact standard through judicial or
legislative means. The legal community, as well as the general
Exec. Order No. 13107, 3 C.F.R. 234 (1998).
An example of this is the effort made by U.S. Human Rights Network,
which has urged the Senate Judiciary Committee to effectively implement the
provisions of CERD. See The Law of the Land: U.S. Implementation of
Human Rights Treaties: Hearing before the S. JudiciarySubcomm. on Human
Rights and the Law 111th Cong,. 1st Sess. (2009) (statement of CERD Task
Force, U.S. Human Rights Network).
224
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public, must be made aware of the threat the Intent Doctrine
poses to international human rights ideals, and take action to
address this issue. Without such action, the United States will
fall further behind the rest of the world by not living up to its
CERD obligations or providing adequate discrimination remedies for its residents.
CONCLUSION

The United States' narrow Intent Doctrine is incapable of
combating modern discrimination and is also well out of compliance with CERD's definition of discrimination. The international convention offers broad protections aimed at eventually
eliminating racial discrimination worldwide, and yet the United
States refuses to comply with its very definition. Instead, the
United States ratified the convention as a symbolic gesture to
the international community with no intention of amending the
Intent Doctrine through CERD's established enforcement
mechanisms. Thus, the United States is currently a party state to
the Convention but fails to further its human rights mission.
Until the Intent Doctrine is eliminated, United States antidiscrimination law will be increasingly outdated and incapable
of addressing the racial discrimination epidemic. The international community no longer looks to the United States for guidance on discrimination jurisprudence, as it fails to live up to its
human rights obligations to effectively combat racial discrimination. Given its sordid history of discrimination and exclusion
based on race, the United States should carefully reconsider its
ongoing application of the Intent Doctrine-particularly in light
of its incapacity to address contemporary racial discrimination,
its inadequacy to promote the human rights ideals promoted in
CERD, and its continuing blight on the United States' reputation as a nation of equal protection under the law.
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